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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• This report seeks to contribute to public and policy debates on the 
value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist 
material. We look in particular at aggressive account and content 
takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and 
its impacts.
• Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a con-
ducive space for Islamic State (IS) accounts and communities to 
flourish, although IS continues to distribute propaganda through 
this channel. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to 
the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there 
is differential disruption taking place.
• IS’s and other jihadists’ online activity was never solely restricted 
to Twitter. Twitter is just one node in a wider jihadist social media 
ecology. We describe and discuss this, and supply some prelimi-
nary analysis of disruption trends in this area.
• Our analysis rests on a dataset containing 722 pro-IS accounts 
(labelled Pro-IS throughout) and a convenience sample of 451 
other jihadist accounts (labelled Other Jihadist throughout), 
including those supportive of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 
Ahrar al-Sham, the Taliban and al-Shabaab, active on Twitter 
at any point between 1 February and 7 April 2017.
• The Pro-IS accounts were located and identified using three 
methods: the original seed set of accounts (27%) were manually 
identified by the research team; the second set of accounts (30%) 
were identified ‘semi-automatically’ (i.e. automatically identified 
by the system and manually inspected and verified); and the 
third group of accounts (43%) were identified using an ‘advanced 
semi-automatic’ system via IS propaganda links.
DISRUPTING DAESH5
• For the Pro-IS accounts, 57,574 tweets were collected, with 
7,216 (12.5%) of these tweets containing out-links, i.e. links to 
wider websites, social media platforms, content hosting sites, etc. 
(not including links within Twitter). For the Other Jihadist 
accounts, 62,156 tweets were collected, of which 7,928 (13%) 
contained out-links.
• One of the overarching objectives of this research was to provide 
an up-to-date account of the effects of Twitter’s disruption 
strategy on IS supporter accounts. We found that pro-IS accounts 
faced substantial and aggressive disruption, particularly those 
linking to official IS content hosted on a range of other platforms. 
The majority – around 65% – of the Pro-IS accounts in our dataset 
were suspended within 70 days of their establishment, with 
the overall suspension rate of pro-IS accounts probably being 
considerably higher.
• In a case study of accounts posting links to official IS content 
in a 24-hour period on 3 and 4 April 2017, 153 accounts were 
identified. A subset of 50 were ‘throwaway accounts’ (i.e. accounts 
specifically created on 3 April to disseminate IS propaganda with 
no expectation that they would stay online for any significant 
period of time). Together these accounts sent a total of 842 tweets 
with out-links to IS propaganda on other online platforms. Within 
this 24-hour period, 65% of accounts were suspended within the 
first 17 hours (07.00–00.00 GMT). The 50 throwaway accounts 
suffered even higher levels of disruption, with a 75% suspension 
rate during the same time period. This demonstrates that the 
disruption to official IS propaganda distribution was reasonably 
effective in the first 24 hours after linking the content.
• We also compared the suspension rates of Pro-IS accounts 
versus Other Jihadist accounts to check for differential disruption. 
We found that more than 25% of Pro-IS accounts were suspended 
within five days of their creation; a negligible number (less than 1%) 
of Other Jihadist accounts were subject to the same rapid 
response. Of those accounts in our dataset that were eventually 
suspended (i.e. 455 Pro-IS accounts and 163 Other Jihadist), more 
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than 30% of Pro-IS accounts were suspended within two days 
of their creation; less than 1% of Other Jihadist accounts met the 
same fate.
• As a result of this disruption, IS’s ability to facilitate and maintain 
strong and influential communities on Twitter was found to 
be significantly diminished. Relationship networks were much 
sparser for Pro-IS accounts than Other Jihadist accounts. Other 
Jihadist accounts had the opportunity to send six times as many 
tweets, follow or ‘friend’ four times as many accounts and, 
critically, gain 13 times as many followers as Pro-IS accounts.
• Pro-IS users who persistently returned to Twitter resorted to 
adopting counter-measures, such as locking accounts, diluting the 
content of tweets, using innocuous profile pictures, and adopting 
meaningless Twitter handles. This situation makes it extremely 
difficult to maintain a strong and influential virtual community.
• Twitter is, however, just one node in a wider jihadist social 
media ecology. Therefore, we analysed a sample of destinations 
from Twitter for official IS propaganda at three time points 
(4–8 February, 4–8 March (excluding 7 March), and 4–8 April 
2017). During these periods, Pro-IS accounts linked to 39 dif-
ferent third-party platforms or content hosting sites, as well as 
running its own server to host material. Of these, six remained 
prominent across the three time periods: justpaste.it, IS’s own 
server, archive.org, sendvid.com, YouTube and Google Drive. 
These domains accounted for 83%, 70% and 67% of the URLs 
in the February, March and April sampling periods respectively. 
The takedown rate (as of 12 April) was 72%, 66% and 72% for 
the same sampling periods.
• Only 20 (or 0.04%) of all tweets from Pro-IS accounts contained 
a telegram.me link. The paucity of such links caused us to explore 
further; we found that just two of 722 Pro-IS users’ biographies 
and two of 451 Other Jihadist users’ biographies contained 
Telegram links. Neither group of accounts was therefore using 
Twitter to advertise its presence on Telegram.
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• Our report makes three recommendations:
1. Modern social media monitoring systems have the ability 
to dramatically increase the speed and effectiveness of 
data gathering, analysis and (potentially) intervention, but 
probably only when deployed in combination with trained 
human analysts.
2. Active IS supporters who remain on Twitter, in particular 
content disseminators and their throwaway accounts, could 
probably be degraded further – though this may have both 
pros (e.g. detrimental impact on last remaining signifi-
cant IS supporter Twitter activity) and cons (e.g. further 
degradation of Twitter as a source of data or open source 
intelligence on IS).
3. Our focus was largely on Twitter, but we also pointed to 
the importance of the wider jihadist social media ecology. 
As our analysis was not restricted to IS users and content, 
we also underline the often uninterrupted online presence 
and activity of non-IS jihadists. We point to the usefulness 
of maintaining a wide-angle view of the online activity 
of a diversity of these, particularly HTS, across a variety 
of social media and other online platforms.
• For the future, we propose replicating the present research, 
but with a larger and more equal sample of HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, 
and Taliban accounts. This would allow for a more systematic 
and comparative analysis of the levels of disruption of a range of 
non-IS jihadists, the vibrancy of their contemporary Twitter com-
munities and Twitter out-linking practices. It would also allow 
us to identify their other preferred online platforms. Additional 
research is clearly also warranted into the wider jihadist social 
media ecology. In particular, we suggest analysing pro-IS and 
other jihadist activity on Telegram, which is almost certainly 
where IS’s online community has reconstituted, and comparing 
this with our present findings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
use of the Internet, particularly social media, by violent extrem-
ists and terrorists and their supporters is a source of concern for 
policy-makers and the public. This is due to apparent connections 
between consumption of, and networking around, violent extremist 
and terrorist online content. Concerns are focused on:
• adoption of extremist ideology – i.e. so-called ‘(violent) online 
radicalisation’;
• recruitment into violent extremist or terrorist groups 
or movements; and/or
• attack planning and preparation.
Particular concerns have been raised regarding easy access to 
large volumes of potentially influential violent extremist and terrorist 
content on prominent and heavily trafficked social media platforms. 
The micro-blogging platform Twitter has been subject to particular 
scrutiny, especially regarding their response to use of their platform 
by the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS), also known as ‘Daesh’.
One of the major aims of this analysis is to supply an up-to-date 
account of the effects of Twitter’s disruption strategy on IS-supporter 
accounts. Twitter continues to be ‘called out’ in the media and by 
policy-makers for the use of their platform by a variety of violent 
extremists. However, Twitter is not alone among social media 
companies and other online platforms in hosting extremist accounts 
and content.1 The company has taken significant steps over the last 
three years to disrupt IS activity on their platform. Detailed descrip-
tion and analysis of the precise nature of this disruption activity 
1 See, for example, UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 
Hate Crime: Abuse, Hate and Extremism Online, London: House 
of Commons, 2017.
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and, importantly, its effects is sparse. Therefore, this report aims to 
contribute to public and policy debates on the value of disruption 
activity, particularly aggressive account and content takedown, 
by seeking to accurately measure this activity and its impacts. Our 
findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space 
for IS accounts and communities to flourish, although IS continue 
to distribute propaganda through the platform. Not all jihadists on 
Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, how-
ever, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. 
An important related point is that the social media presence of IS and 
other jihadists has never been solely restricted to Twitter. Twitter is 
just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. We describe 
and discuss this, and supply some preliminary analysis of disruption 
trends in this area.
2. SOCIAL MEDIA 
MONITORING: 
METHODOLOGY
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for this project we developed a semi-automated methodology for 
identifying pro-jihadist accounts on Twitter. Figure 1 illustrates this 
methodology, which was implemented using the social media analysis 
platform known as Method52.2
Figure 1. Detailed flow diagram for semi-automated social media analysis
The first step was to identify candidate accounts of interest. Our 
approach was based on finding tweets that had specific terms of 
interest in them (i.e. ‘seed search terms’) and/or finding accounts that 
were in some way related to other accounts known to be of interest 
(i.e. ‘seed accounts’). See step 1 in Figure 1.
When a tweet matched these search criteria, it was automatically 
analysed to see if it was actually relevant, using a machine-learning 
classifier trained to mimic the classification decisions of a human 
analyst.3 A key task of the relevancy classifier was to separate target 
Twitter accounts from other Twitter accounts using similar language 
(e.g. journalist or researcher accounts). If the tweet was deemed rele-
vant, then further historic tweets were automatically extracted for the 
candidate account and assessed for relevancy (see step 2 in Figure 1). 
2 Method52 was developed by the TAG Laboratory at the University of 
Sussex. For more information, see www.taglaboratory.org.
3 Classifiers were trained using semi-supervised machine learning 
approaches. Method52 provides components that enable this to be done 
swiftly and in a manner that is bespoke to a project.
Seed search
terms
1
DATA STORE
• Account details
• Tweet details
• Link details
Analyse links in
flagged tweets
Assess
relevancy
Identify new
terms
Score and analyse
confirmed accounts
Tweets
Seed
accounts
6
2
4
3
5
DISRUPTING DAESH12
This provided the system with an aggregate view of the tweet history 
of the account. This overview of the tweet history was combined with 
other account metadata that could be extracted; these pieces of infor-
mation were scored automatically and candidate Twitter accounts 
that exceeded the set thresholds were presented to a human analyst 
for decision (step 3).
If the analyst confirmed that the account was pro-jihadist, then 
the out-links found in all the account’s tweets were automatically 
analysed (step 4) and details of the account, its tweets and its links 
stored (step 5).
Information from new confirmed accounts was used by the 
system in a feedback loop to continually improve the efficiency 
of the system, thereby identifying new seed search terms (step 6) 
and providing additional seed accounts (step 2).
2.1 CAVEATS
There are a number of caveats attached to the data-collection process:
• The bulk of data gathering was undertaken over two months 
in early 2017. The system to implement our semi-automated 
methodology was created, tested and evolved throughout this 
period. Online accounts it returned were integrated with those 
found via traditional, manual search for accounts of interest. The 
overall approach was, therefore, a combination of automated and 
manual, and snowball and purposive sampling methods.
• Not all the available data was captured. There were various 
periods of downtime for the semi-automated system throughout 
this period as we developed and modified the methodology. 
Further, we were unable to include some accounts found via 
automated means because they were taken down before the 
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human analyst could assess and confirm their affiliation.4 By the 
project’s end, when the system was working optimally, 100% of 
these accounts were identified by the software as pro-IS, reflecting 
the high level of disruption of IS-related accounts. We discuss this 
further below.
• The semi-automated system primarily focused on pro-IS accounts 
operating in English and Arabic or some combination of these 
languages. There is a possibility that accounts using, for example, 
Bahasa,5 Russian or Turkish were overlooked. We believe this 
possibility is worth mentioning but is negligible, as the system’s 
effectiveness improved as we learned more about pro-IS users’ 
contemporary Twitter activity and refined the methodology 
accordingly. By early April, for example, the software was able to 
identify accounts directly distributing IS propaganda with very 
high precision, no matter what language was used. At the same 
time, we believe it also identified the majority of accounts linking 
to that propaganda.
• Our data from the latter stages of this project suggests that around 
50 or more throwaway IS accounts were produced daily. These 
accounts appear to be set up solely to distribute propaganda, 
typically have no followers and send only IS propaganda tweets 
until they are suspended. If we had been gathering all of these 
throwaway IS accounts over the whole research period, we would 
have had many hundreds more – perhaps as many as 2,000 to 
3,000 accounts – in our sample data set. The analysis that follows 
is however based on pro-IS accounts with at least one follower and 
thus excludes these throwaway accounts unless otherwise stated. 
4 This is a perennial issue in this type of research. It is also mentioned, for 
example, in J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: 
Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter, 
Washington DC: Brookings, 2015, p.41 and p.44.
5 J.M. Berger and Heather Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns 
on Twitter: How Suspensions are Limiting the Social Networks of English-
speaking ISIS Supporters, Washington DC: George Washington University 
Program on Extremism, 2016, p.6.
3. OUR DATA
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the research dataset comprised 722 pro-IS accounts (labelled 
Pro-IS throughout) and 451 other jihadist accounts (labelled Other 
Jihadist throughout) with at least one follower active on Twitter at any 
time between 1 February and 7 April 2017 (see Table 1). Accounts were 
defined as pro-IS if their avatar or carousel image contained explicitly 
pro-IS imagery and/or text, and/or they had at least one recent tweet 
by the user (i.e. not a retweet) that contained explicitly pro-IS images 
and/or text, such as referring to IS as ‘Dawlah’ or their fighters as 
‘lions’. Accounts maintained by journalists and others who tweeted, 
for example, Amaq News Agency content for informational purposes, 
were manually excluded. The Other Jihadist accounts included, 
among others, those supportive of HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, the Taliban 
and al-Shabaab. The same parameters were used to categorise 
these accounts.
Table 1. Description of final dataset
PRO-IS OTHER JIHADIST
Number of accounts 722 451
Number of tweets 57,574 62,156
Number of out-links 7,216 7,928
Percentage of tweets containing out-links 12.5% 13%
The accounts in our dataset were located and identified in 
three different ways (see Table 2). One set of accounts was manually 
identified by the research team, principally by looking at known jihadi 
accounts (or those known to be of interest to jihadi supporters) and 
inspecting accounts that were following or being followed by them. 
A second group of accounts was identified semi-automatically – that 
is, automatically by the above-described social-media monitoring 
system and then manually inspected by a human analyst who con-
firmed: (i) whether they were jihadist accounts or not; and (ii) if they 
were, of what type. Several approaches were used to identify seed 
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accounts or generate seed accounts. 
This included analysing the vocab-
ulary being used in known jihadi 
accounts that were currently or had 
recently been active, determining 
which terms were being used much 
more often than would be expected 
statistically, and searching for tweets 
that contained these terms. These 
candidates were then winnowed 
based on the relevancy of their 
tweets in general (see above) and 
other metadata. A third group of 
accounts was identified automatically by the social-media monitoring 
system based on the presence of known IS propaganda links. These 
links were first identified through other tracking procedures, includ-
ing (but not limited to) being spotted in confirmed IS tweets.
It is important to underline that our pro-IS Twitter account 
dataset is as close as possible – taking into account the caveats 
in section 2.1 above – to a full dataset of explicitly IS-supportive 
accounts with at least one follower for the period studied. On the 
other hand, the Other Jihadist category is a convenience sample of 
non-IS jihadist Twitter accounts collected for comparison purposes 
and in no way reflects the true number of these accounts on Twitter.
Table 2. Location and identification of Twitter accounts
PRO-IS OTHER JIHADIST
NO. % NO. %
Manually identified 193 27 332 74
Semi-automated 218 30 119 26
Advanced semi-automated 311 43 – –
TOTAL 722 451
Accounts were defined as 
Pro-IS if their avatar or carousel 
image contained explicitly pro-IS 
imagery and/or text, and/or they 
had at least one recent tweet 
by the user (i.e. not a retweet) 
that contained explicitly pro-IS 
images and/or text, such as 
referring to IS as ‘Dawlah’ 
or their fighters as ‘lions’.

4. MEASURING 
EFFECTS
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twitter has been one of the most preferred online spaces for 
IS and their supporters, even prior to the establishment of their 
so-called ‘caliphate’ in June 2014. It was estimated that there were 
between 46,000 and 90,000 pro-IS Twitter accounts active in the 
period September to December 2014.6 However, their activity was 
subject to disruption by Twitter from mid-2014 and, although initially 
low level and sporadic, significantly increasing levels of disruption 
were instituted throughout 2015 and 2016. From mid-2015 through 
January 2016, for example, Twitter claimed to have suspended in the 
region of 15,000 to 18,000 IS-supportive accounts per month.7 From 
mid-February to mid-July 2016, this increased to an average of 40,000 
IS-related account suspensions 
per month, according to the com-
pany.8 Despite the growing costs 
attached to remaining on Twitter 
(such as greater effort to maintain 
a public presence while relaying 
diffused messages and deflated 
morale), during this period IS supporters routinely penned online 
missives exhorting ‘Come Back to Twitter’.9 In 2017, is it worthwhile 
for pro-IS users to do so?
Until now, the small amount of publicly available research 
on the online disruption of IS has focused on the impact of Twitter’s 
suspension activities on follower numbers for re-established 
accounts.10 We also looked at the longevity or survival time of 
accounts, and compared Pro-IS to Other Jihadist accounts on both 
measures (i.e. follower numbers and longevity). Our overall finding 
6 Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015, p.9.
7 Twitter, ‘Combating Violent Extremism.’ Twitter Blog, 5 February 2016, 
https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism.
8 Twitter, ‘An Update on our Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism.’ 
Twitter Blog, 18 August 2016, https://blog.twitter.com/2016/
an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism.
9 Cole Bunzel, ‘“Come Back to Twitter”: A Jihadi Warning Against Telegram.’ 
Jihadica, 18 July 2016, www.jihadica.com/come-back-to-twitter/.
10 Berger and Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter, 2016.
It was estimated that there 
were between 46,000 and 90,000 
pro-IS Twitter accounts active 
in the period September to 
December 2014.
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was that pro-IS accounts are being significantly disrupted and this 
has effectively eliminated IS’s once vibrant Twitter community. 
Differential disruption is taking place, however, which means that 
other Jihadist accounts are subject to much less pressure.
4.1 ACCOUNT LONGEVITY
This section addresses the survival time of accounts. All the Twitter 
accounts in our database were active at the time they were identified 
and classified as Pro-IS or Other Jihadist. Once an account was 
entered in the database, we monitored its status and recorded when 
it was suspended, if this subse-
quently occurred. This allowed 
us to measure the age of each 
account (i.e. the time elapsed 
since the account’s creation) at 
the date of suspension. 
Worth underlining here is that 
the below-described survival rates 
of Pro-IS accounts would likely 
have been considerably shorter 
if the analysis included those 
accounts suspended – often within minutes of creation – before they 
could be captured by the research team for inclusion in our dataset.
Figure 2 shows the estimated cumulative suspension rate for all 
Twitter accounts in our dataset, outlining the probability of an account 
being suspended against its age (represented in days) for the 722 Pro-IS 
accounts and 451 Other Jihadist accounts. Figure 2 shows that the 
majority – around 65% – of Pro-IS accounts were suspended before 
they reached 70 days since inception. At the same time point, less than 
20% of Other Jihadist accounts had been suspended. In fact, as regards 
differential disruption, more than 25% of Pro-IS accounts were sus-
pended within five days of inception; a negligible number (less than 1%) 
of Other Jihadist accounts were subject to the same rapid response.
Our categorisation of these accounts as being jihadist in orienta-
tion was necessarily subjective. It is possible that others may disagree.
Once an account was entered in 
the database, we monitored its 
status and recorded when it was 
suspended, if this subsequently 
occurred. This allowed us 
to measure the age of each 
account (i.e. the time elapsed 
since the account’s creation) 
at the date of suspension.
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Figure 2. Cumulative suspension rate for all accounts in database
To address this possibility, Figure 3 focuses on those accounts in 
our dataset that were eventually suspended: 455 Pro-IS accounts 
and 163 Other Jihadist accounts. The rationale is that these accounts 
were judged independently to have breached Twitter’s terms of use. 
Again, as regards differential disruption, our data illustrates that 
85% of Pro-IS accounts were suspended within the first 60 days of 
their life, compared to 40% of accounts falling into the Other Jihadist 
category. More than 30% of Pro-IS accounts were suspended within 
two days of their creation; less than 1% of Other Jihadist accounts 
met the same fate.
Figure 3. Cumulative suspension rate for accounts eventually suspended
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In addition to the differences in longevity of Pro-IS and Other Jihadist 
accounts, the three subsets of Pro-IS accounts (i.e. those identified 
manually, semi-automatically based on general tweet content, and 
semi-automatically as a result of linking to official IS propaganda) also 
displayed different survival and activity patterns. From the 722 Pro-IS 
accounts in our dataset, the manually identified accounts (27%) sur-
vived disruption for longer periods and were predominantly tweeting 
about general IS and non-IS related news. The ‘general content’ 
semi-automated accounts (30%) had a somewhat shorter lifespan 
and were tweeting content generically related to the conflict (e.g. daily 
battle updates from several IS frontlines such as Mosul, Al-Bab, Deir 
Ez-Zor, eastern Aleppo, etc.). The advanced semi-automated group 
(43%) experienced the shortest lifespans. They were initially identi-
fied as a result of sending at least one tweet specifically disseminating 
‘official’ IS propaganda (e.g. from the Amaq News Agency). Many were 
then found to be exclusively tweeting links to official IS propaganda.
4.1.1. Case Study: Intervention Effectiveness
Throughout the period of data collection, IS operated a 24-hour 
‘news cycle,’ disseminating a new batch of propaganda on a daily 
basis via Twitter and other online platforms, using links to content 
hosted elsewhere on the Internet. These may be so-called ‘ghazwa’ 
or social media ‘raids’ orchestrated 
using some other online platform,
potentially Telegram11 and/or the 
dark web. The rapid takedown of 
Twitter accounts sending tweets con-
taining links to official IS propaganda 
is seen in greater detail in this case 
study, which shows the effectiveness 
of intervention over a single 24-hour 
period. Figure 4 depicts survival 
11 Nico Prucha, ‘IS and the Jihadist Information Highway: Projecting 
Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram.’ Perspectives on Terrorism,  
10(6), 2016, pp.51–52.
The rapid takedown of Twitter 
accounts sending tweets 
containing links to official IS 
propaganda is seen in greater 
detail in this case study, which 
shows the effectiveness of 
intervention over a single 
24-hour period.
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curves for Twitter accounts that disseminated links to one or more 
pieces of official IS propaganda produced on Monday 3 April12 (based 
on data collected on Monday 3 April and Tuesday 4 April 2017).13
On Monday 3 April 2017, IS uploaded its daily propaganda content 
to a variety of social media and online content-hosting platforms. 
This content generally included videos (in daily news format and 
other propaganda videos), ‘picture stories’ (a photo montage that 
tells a story), brief pronouncements similar to short press releases, 
radio podcasts and other documents (e.g. magazines). Over the course 
of Monday afternoon and evening, 153 unique Twitter accounts 
were identified that sent a total of 842 tweets with links to external 
(non-Twitter) web pages, each loaded with an item or items of IS 
propaganda. We identified only 10 of those Twitter accounts (7%) as 
being independent, third-party ‘mainstream’ accounts. The balance of 
accounts were identified as pro-IS. Fifty of these accounts appeared to 
be throwaway accounts created on Monday evening.
12 By early April 2017, the research reached the stage where there was 
complete access to IS’s main Twitter propaganda apparatus. This enabled 
the semi-automated system to determine what IS and supporter tweets 
would be linking to before those tweets were sent. It is thought that this 
occurred several hours before Twitter themselves became aware of these 
accounts and their tweets. Much of this may have been due to the research 
team being able to access data and intelligence across multiple sites, 
allowing early prediction of tweet material, where Twitter’s disruption team 
were likely restricted to monitoring their own platform only. The system 
was thus able to immediately identify when an account disseminated one of 
these propaganda links on Twitter. It was then possible to capture the rate 
and speed of suspension.
13 It should be noted that this date was chosen at random and thus 
propaganda represented in this graph had no relation to the chemical attack 
on the town of Khan Shaykhun, also on 4 April, as the propaganda was 
produced by IS on Monday 3 April 2017.
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Figure 4. Case study of intervention effectiveness: survival of IS 
disseminator accounts 4–6 April 2017
The semi-automated system tracked all the accounts disseminating 
this propaganda – those sending one or more tweets with a 3 April 
propaganda link at some point prior to 06.00 GMT on the morning 
of Tuesday 4 April 2017. Figure 4 shows the survival curves for all 153 
Twitter accounts tweeting IS propaganda from Monday 3 April and for 
the subset of 50 accounts specifically created on the Monday evening. 
The data shows that, at 07.00 GMT on Tuesday 4 April 2017, 100% 
of these accounts were active. However, by 13.00 GMT, only 73% of 
the 153 accounts were still active, falling to 58% by 23.00 GMT. This 
then dropped sharply to 35% surviving un-suspended by midnight on 
Tuesday. Very few of these surviving accounts were suspended over 
the subsequent 48 hours that we tracked. The 50 throwaway accounts 
created on Monday evening specifically to disseminate propaganda 
were suspended or deleted even faster: by 13.00 GMT only 52% 
were still active, falling to 34% by 23.00 GMT and 24% by midnight 
on Tuesday.
Figure 5 illustrates which accounts were responsible for posting 
original links (i.e. links that had not been sent before by another 
Twitter account). The diagram shows the account that sent the tweet 
(labelled Account 1, Account 2, etc. in order to retain user anonym-
ity), the domain the link pointed at (e.g. sendvid.com), the time the 
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tweet was sent, the language used, and whether the account was a 
‘mainstream’ third-party account or a pro-IS account. Overall, we 
identified 19 accounts sending original links to a total of 24 different 
URLs (destinations). Two of the accounts (identified as Account 1 and 
Account 2 in Figure 5) were mainstream, independent third-party 
accounts. A third account (Account 3) is a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, 
a fake account, a duplicate of the account of a widely followed, 
US-based new media journalist. This was an old account, unused since 
mid-2013, which was hacked (presumably by IS) and used to transmit 
IS propaganda since 26 March 2017.14 Account 1 is not a pro-IS user, 
but more of a citizen journalism-type account that albeit outside of 
the region was nonetheless in a position to supply three ‘exclusives’ 
(first releases) of pieces of official IS propaganda during the day. The 
mainstream accounts (including the fake one) and one known IS 
supporter account (i.e. Account 4) all tweeted in English. It is likely, 
however, that there were other English language accounts taken 
down before 06.00 GMT on Tuesday 4 April when we first identified 
the propaganda accounts. Most of the tweets and accounts in this case 
study were in Arabic, with an additional small number in Somali.
What this shows is that the response to official IS propaganda being 
distributed via Twitter was reasonably effective in terms of identifying 
and taking down such disseminator accounts in the first 24 hours 
after linking to official IS content. Comparing these rates to the rates 
across our entire Pro-IS dataset, it was also clear that those accounts 
disseminating official IS propaganda were taken down at a higher rate, 
compared to other pro-IS accounts that were not disseminating this 
propaganda. However, it must be borne in mind that pro-IS users were 
operating on a 24-hour ‘news cycle’ and creating a large number of 
accounts every day to disseminate daily propaganda. As these accounts 
were being taken down during Tuesday, a similar number of fresh 
accounts were being created and used to distribute the next day’s official 
IS content. Therefore, it could be argued that, while efforts to remove 
14 The account was still live as of 21 April 2017. For more on such accounts, 
see Berger and Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter, 
2016, p.16.
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permanent traces of IS propaganda links from Twitter were relatively 
successful, IS was still able to broadcast links to its daily propaganda 
using Twitter in 24-hour bursts during the research period.
Figure 5. Case study of intervention effectiveness: IS disseminator account
types, tweet timings, languages and URL destinations, 4 April 2017
4.2 COMMUNITY BREAKDOWN
What are the effects of this disruption of IS accounts? The 
truncated survival rates for Pro-IS accounts meant that their 
relationship networks were much sparser than for the Other 
Jihadist accounts in our dataset and compared to previously 
mapped IS-supporter networks on Twitter. From a more qualitative 
perspective, this means that the IS Twitter community was virtually 
non-existent in the research period.
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Table 3. Median number of tweets, followers and friends for accounts not
yet suspended 
TWEETS FOLLOWERS FRIENDS
Pro-IS 51 14 33
Other Jihadist 320 189 122
Table 3 compares the median number of tweets, followers 
and friends of Pro-IS accounts versus those of Other Jihadists. 
The short lifespan of the Pro-IS accounts meant that many had only 
a small window in which to tweet, gain followers and follow other 
accounts. This resulted in the Other Jihadist accounts enjoying the 
opportunity to: send six times as many tweets; follow or ‘friend’ four 
times as many accounts; and importantly, gain 13 times as many follow-
ers as the Pro-IS accounts. An even more stark comparison is between 
median figures for contemporary Pro-IS accounts versus those recorded 
for similar accounts in 2014. The median number of followers for 
contemporary Pro-IS accounts was 14 versus 177 in 2014,15 a decrease of 
92%. The median number of accounts followed by IS supporters in 2014 
was 257, while we recorded a median of 33 ‘friends’ per Pro-IS account – 
a decrease of 87%.16 In an analysis of 20,000 IS supporter accounts 
over five months (September 2014 to January 2015), Berger and Morgan 
observed suspension of just 678 accounts, a total loss of 3.4%.17 In our 
dataset, the total loss of Pro-IS accounts in just four months (between 
January and April 2017) was 63%. It is worth noting that the total loss of 
pro-IS accounts over the period studied would have been dramatically 
higher had we included not just accounts with a minimum of one 
follower, but all the throwaway accounts generated in the same period. 
Considering also those accounts we were unable to capture due to their 
suspension within minutes of creation, the total loss of IS-supportive 
accounts over the period was probably greater than 90%.
15 Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015, p.30.
16 Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015, p.32.
17 Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015, p.33.
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In the IS Twitter ‘Golden Age’ in 2013 and 2014, a variety of 
official IS ‘fighter’ and an assortment of other IS ‘fan’ accounts could 
be accessed with relative ease. For the uninitiated user, once one 
IS-related account was located, the automated Twitter recommen-
dations on ‘who to follow’ accurately supplied others. For those 
‘in the know’, pro-IS users were easily and quickly identifiable via 
their choice of carousel and avatar images, along with their user 
handles and screen names. Therefore, if one wished, it was quick and 
easy to become connected to a large number of like-minded other 
Twitter users. If sufficient time and effort was invested, it was also 
relatively straightforward to become a trusted – even prominent – 
member of the IS ‘Twittersphere.’18 Not only was there a vibrant over-
arching pro-IS Twitter community in existence at this time, but also 
a whole series of strong and supportive language (e.g. Arabic, English, 
French, Russian, Turkish) and/or ethnicity-based (e.g. Chechens or 
‘al-Shishanis’) and other special interest (e.g. females or ‘sisters’19) 
Twitter sub-communities. Most of these special interest groups were 
a mix of: a small number of users actually on the ground in Syria; 
a larger number of users seeking to travel (or with a stated preference 
to do so); and an even larger number of so-called ‘jihobbyists’20 with 
no formal affiliation to any jihadist group, but who spent their time 
lauding fighters, celebrating suicide attackers and other ‘martyrs’ and 
networking around and disseminating IS content.
In 2014, pro-IS users were already under some pressure from 
Twitter; for example, official IS accounts were some of the first to be 
suspended in summer 2014. Twitter’s disruption activity increased 
18 See, for example, the extensive media coverage of the Twitter user 
@ShamiWitness who was revealed in December 2014 to be Mehdi Biswas, 
a 24-year-old Bangalore-based business executive, who prior to his arrest 
was one of the most prominent IS supporters on social media. Interestingly, 
his Twitter account was only suspended in early 2017, despite being 
dormant since his arrest. Biswas is awaiting trial in India.
19 Elizabeth Pearson, ‘Wilayat Twitter and the Battle Against Islamic 
State’s Twitter Jihad.’ VOX-Pol Blog, 11 November, 2015, www.voxpol.eu/
wilayat-twitter-and-the-battle-against-islamic-states-twitter-jihad.
20 Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009, p.19.
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significantly over time, forcing pro-IS users to develop and institute 
a host of tactics to allow them to maintain their Twitter presences, 
remain active and preserve their communities of support on the 
platform.21 For example, the group used particular hashtags, such as 
#baqiyyafamily (‘baqiyya’ means ‘remain’ in Arabic) to announce the 
return of suspended users to the platform, in an attempt to regroup 
after their suspension. Twitter eventually responded by including 
these hashtags in their disruption strategies. Interestingly, this 
increased disruption strengthened some IS supporters’ resolve and 
they became even more deter-
mined to re-establish their 
accounts, even after repeated 
suspensions. This may have 
resulted in decreased numbers 
of pro-IS users, but also more 
close-knit and unified communi-
ties, because those who remained 
needed a high level of commit-
ment and virtual community 
support to do so.22
Eventually, however, the costs of remaining began to outweigh 
the benefits. Research from 2016 shows that “the depressive effects of 
suspension often continued even after an account returned and was 
not immediately re-suspended. Returning accounts rarely reached 
their previous heights,”23 in terms of numbers of followers and 
friends. This was probably due to the eventual discouragement of 
many IS supporters subjected to rapid and repeated suspension. 
21 For examples, see Berger and Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns 
on Twitter, 2016, pp.15–18.
22 Pearson, ‘Wilayat Twitter and the Battle Against Islamic State’s Twitter 
Jihad’. VOX-Pol Blog, 11 November, 2015, www.voxpol.eu/wilayat-twitter-
and-the-battle-against-islamic-states-twitter-jihad. See also Elizabeth 
Pearson, ‘Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender, and ISIS-takedown 
on Social Media.’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (forthcoming).
23 Berger and Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter, 
2016, p.9.
Twitter’s disruption activity 
increased significantly over time, 
forcing pro-IS users to develop 
and institute a host of tactics 
to allow them to maintain their 
Twitter presences, remain active 
and preserve their communities 
of support on the platform.
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Even those who persisted had to take counter-measures such as 
locking their accounts so they were no longer publicly accessible, or 
diluting the content of their tweets so their commitment to IS was no 
longer as readily apparent. By April 2017, these measures had taken 
such hold that the vast majority of Pro-IS account avatar images were 
default ‘eggs’ or other innocuous images, and many of the account 
user handles and screen names were meaningless combinations of 
letters and numbers (see Table 4). A conscious, supportive and 
influential virtual community is almost impossible to maintain in the 
face of the loss of access to such group or ideological symbols and the 
resultant breakdown in commitment. Therefore, IS supporters have 
re-located their social media community-building activity elsewhere, 
primarily to Telegram,24 which is no longer just a back-up for Twitter.25
From a quantitative perspec-
tive, the data discussed in this 
section demonstrates three key 
findings. First, IS and their sup-
porters were being significantly 
disrupted by Twitter, where the 
rate of disruption depended 
on the content of tweets and 
out-links. Second, although all 
accounts experienced some 
type of suspension over a period 
of time, Pro-IS accounts expe-
rienced this at a much higher rate compared to the Other Jihadist 
accounts in the dataset. Third, this has severely affected IS’s ability to 
develop and maintain robust and influential communities on Twitter. 
As a result, pro-IS Twitter activity has largely been reduced to tactical 
use of throwaway accounts for distributing links to pro-IS content 
on other platforms, rather than as a space for public IS support and 
influencing activity.
24 Prucha,‘IS and the Jihadist Information Highway’, 2016.
25 Berger and Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter, 
2016, p.15.
As a result [of disruption 
by Twitter], pro-IS Twitter 
activity has largely been reduced 
to tactical use of throwaway 
accounts for distributing links 
to pro-IS content on other 
platforms, rather than as 
a space for public IS support 
and influencing activity.
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Table 4. Changes in account name types due to disruption activity*
TYPICAL USER HANDLES 
2014–2015
TYPICAL USER HANDLES 
2017
Mujahid1985 4iM7EjZphT3OXYG
BintSham 5Asdf68
ukhtialalmani Omar_08
Khilafah78 t7dYqgYMaSB4EcI
ShamGreenbird GilUllul
* These are not real account screen names but composite examples constructed 
for illustration purposes.
5. BEYOND TWITTER: 
THE WIDER 
JIHADIST SOCIAL 
MEDIA ECOLOGY
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research on the intersections of violent extremism and terrorism 
and the Internet have, for some time, been largely concerned with 
social media. They have often had a singular focus on Twitter because 
of its particular affordances – e.g. ease of data collection due to its pub-
licness, and the nature of its application programming interface (API) – 
which is problematic.26 For example, EUROPOL’s Internet Referral Unit 
reported that, by mid-2016, they had identified “70 platforms used by 
terrorist groups to spread their propaganda materials”.27 Therefore, this 
section of the report is concerned with the wider social media ecology 
where IS supporters and other non-IS jihadist users operate, with 
a particular focus on out-links from Twitter.
Partly because of its 140-character limit, Twitter functions as 
a ‘gateway’ platform28 to other social networking sites and a diversity 
of other online spaces. In 2014, it was estimated that one in every 2.5 
pro-IS tweets contained a URL. It was acknowledged at the time that 
it would be useful to analyse these links, but this was not undertaken 
due to complications around Twitter’s URL-shortening practices.29 
The roll-out of auto-expanding link previews by Twitter in July 2015 
remedied this difficulty. In terms of link activity in our data, most links 
were not out-links, but rather in-links (i.e. within Twitter): 8,086 or 14% 
for Pro-IS and 4,650 or 7.5% for Other Jihadist tweets. Of the Pro-IS and 
Other Jihadist Twitter accounts we identified, 1 in 8 (around 13%) con-
tained non-Twitter URLs or out-links. This is a considerable reduction 
from the 40% of tweets reportedly containing URLs in 2014. Analysis 
of Twitter out-links nonetheless provides an interesting snapshot of the 
26 Maura Conway, ‘Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism 
and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research.’ Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, 40(1), 2017, p.9 and p.12.
27 EUROPOL, EU Internet Referral Unit: Year One Report, The Hague: 
EUROPOL, 2016, p.11, https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications- 
documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-year-one-report-highlights.
28 Derek O’Callaghan, Derek Greene, Maura Conway, Joe Carthy and 
Pádraig Cunningham, ‘Uncovering the Wider Structure of Extreme 
Right Communities Spanning Popular Online Networks.’ In WebSci ’13: 
Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Web Science Conference, New York: 
ACM Digital Library, 2013, pp.276–285.
29 Berger and Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census, 2015, p.21.
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Top 10 platforms linked to by Pro-IS and Other Jihadist accounts in our 
data-collection period (see Table 5).
Table 5. Top 10 other platforms (based on out-links from Twitter)
Interestingly, YouTube was the top linked-to platform for both Pro-IS 
and Other Jihadist accounts. This points to the overall importance of 
YouTube and of video to Web 2.0 in the jihadist online scene. Facebook 
does not appear in the Top 10 out-links for Pro-IS accounts. This indi-
cates that, like Twitter, Facebook is also engaged in differential disrup-
tion as it is the second most preferred platform for out-linking by Other 
Jihadists. The somewhat obscure justpaste.it content upload site has 
been known for some time as a core node in the ‘jihadisphere’ and so it is 
PRO-IS OTHER JIHADIST
PLATFORM NUMBER
% OF ALL 
PRO-IS TWEETS PLATFORM NUMBER
% OF ALL OTHER 
JIHADIST TWEETS
1. YouTube 1,330 2.3% 1. YouTube 2,488 4.0%
2. Google Drive 792 1.4% 2. Facebook 1,294 2.1%
3. justpaste.it 472 0.82% 3. justpaste.it 479 0.77%
4. Google Photos 431 0.75% 4. Islamic prayers 
website
316 0.51%
5. sendvid.com 410 0.71% 5. Taliban news 
website
244 0.39%
6. archive.org 353 0.61% 6. Official Taliban 
website
228 0.37%
7. archive.is 243 0.42% 7. Taliban’s official 
Urdu website
208 0.33%
8. Bahasa IS fan site 198 0.34% 8. Hizb ut-Tahrir 
website
189 0.30%
9. medium.com 155 0.27% 9. Telegram 111 0.18%
10. Unofficial Arabic 
IS news site
139 0.24% 10. Taliban’s official 
English website
103 0.17%
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unsurprising that it should appear as 
the third most linked-to site for both 
Pro-IS and Other Jihadist accounts.
Other content upload desti-
nations preferred by Pro-IS users, 
including Google Drive, Sendvid, 
Google Photos and the Web Archive, 
do not appear in the Other Jihadist 
Top 10. One reason for this is prob-
ably the focus of Other Jihadists on 
linking to traditional proprietary websites, such as the Taliban’s suite 
of sites. It is worth mentioning that, while Telegram slips into the Top 
10 for Other Jihadists, only 20 (or 0.04%) of all tweets from Pro-IS 
accounts contained a telegram.me link. The paucity of such links 
caused us to explore further; we were surprised to find that just two 
of 722 Pro-IS users’ biographies and two of 451 Other Jihadist users’ 
biographies contained Telegram links. Neither group of accounts was 
using Twitter to advertise ways into Telegram.
5.1 CASE STUDY: DESTINATIONS OF OFFICIAL 
IS PROPAGANDA
As mentioned, when we undertook our research, IS was operating 
a 24-hour ‘news cycle,’ disseminating a daily batch of new official 
propaganda via social media channels, including Twitter. Links 
to the propaganda were circulated via tweets and other means. 
These links point to a wide variety of other social media platforms 
and content hosts that contained uploaded propaganda daily. We 
analysed a sample of these propaganda destinations at three time 
points: 4–8 February, 4–8 March (excluding 7 March, see below), and 
4–8 April 2017. We obtained the full daily roster of IS propaganda 
and the sites where it appeared for each of these time periods. This 
allowed us to identify the most frequently linked-to platforms, along 
with how many pieces of propaganda were posted by host domains, 
and what proportion of these URLs were subsequently taken down 
(see Figure 6).
YouTube was the top linked-to 
platform for both Pro-IS and Other 
Jihadist accounts. This points to 
the overall importance of YouTube 
and of video to Web 2.0 in the 
jihadist online scene. Facebook 
does not appear in the Top 10 
out-links for Pro-IS accounts.
DISRUPTING DAESH36
Figure 6. Destinations of official IS propaganda: Number of URLs and 
URL destinations February to April 2017
* Excludes 7 March which had 240 URLs (Rumiyah release)
Overall, over these three time periods, Pro-IS users linked to 
39 different third-party platforms or sites hosting its propaganda 
material, as well as running its own server to host material.30 It is 
important to note that the former were exclusively (we believe) ‘leaf’ 
destinations. That is, they contained content but no links to other 
sites, so did not have a networking or community-building aspect. 
Someone visiting such a page would learn nothing about the network 
of other sites. Important exceptions to this were YouTube and a small 
number of other sites which algorithmically ‘recommend’ similar 
content in their inventory, which may have resulted in their pointing 
to other available IS propaganda.31 During our analysis, the average 
number of URLs populated rose from 42 per day in February to 
52 per day in April. This hints at increasing fragmentation and 
30 This server had five names over the three periods studied because each 
domain name was rapidly taken down.
31 Derek O’Callaghan, Derek Greene, Maura Conway, Joe Carthy and Pádraig 
Cunningham, ‘Down the (White) Rabbit Hole: The Extreme Right and 
Online Recommender Systems.’ Social Science Computer Review, 2015, 
33(4), pp.459–478.
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dispersal, possibly in response to takedown activity by a variety 
of platforms and sites. However, there was a large inter-day variation 
(20 to 65) and we excluded one outlier day on 7 March, the publi-
cation date of issue 7 of Rumiyah magazine. On this day, IS pushed 
240 separate URLs, a quarter of which contained direct reference to 
Rumiyah in the link, and many more which probably linked to the 
new issue of the magazine.
Out of the 40 domains used (39 external, one internal server) there 
was a consistent ‘big 6’ across the three time periods: justpaste.it; IS’s 
own server; archive.org; sendvid.com; YouTube; and Google Drive. 
These six domains accounted for 83%, 70% and 67% of the URLs in 
the February, March and April sampling periods respectively. However, 
there was a noticeable declining trend in the use of justpaste.it and 
IS’s own servers. Between them, this accounted for 40% of URLs in 
February declining to only 18% by April. Recently the Amaq News 
Agency website has come under repeated attack, which may be respon-
sible for its relative downgrading.32 Use of sendvid.com and archive.org 
varied across the time periods, while Google Drive and YouTube were 
consistently heavily used; YouTube use showed an increasing trend 
(7%, 11% and 12%, respectively). The remaining URLs (17% in February 
rising to 33% of URLs by April) were spread across a wide variety of 
mainly, though not exclusively, content upload sites: 34 in total.
We also analysed what proportion of IS propaganda content 
had been taken down successfully. We found that the takedown 
rate (as of 12 April) was 72%, 66% and 72% for the February, March 
and April samples respectively. Overall, 30% of links were still live 
on 12 April. This suggests that takedown activity is relatively rapid 
(occurring over a matter of days after propaganda is posted) and 
widespread (across a multiplicity of sites and platforms).
32 Lizzie Dearden, ‘ISIS Losing Ground in Online War Against Hackers After 
Westminster Attack Turns Focus on Internet Propaganda’, The Independent, 
1 April 2017.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
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modern social media monitoring systems have the ability to 
dramatically increase the speed and effectiveness of data gathering, 
analysis and (potentially) intervention. To work effectively, however, 
they must deploy a combination of suitable technology solutions, 
including analytical systems, with trained human analysts who 
are versed in the domain deployed and preferably also the relevant 
languages. This is particularly the case where an adversary is actively 
trying to evade tracking efforts. Technology such as Method52 helps 
by allowing the analyst to rapidly develop new analytical pipelines 
that take into account day-to-day changes in modes of operation. 
However, technology cannot detect such changes; these can generally 
only be spotted by a human well-versed in the particular domain 
of interest.
Some IS supporters remain active on Twitter. Content dissem-
inators using throwaway accounts could probably be degraded 
further – though this may have both pros (e.g. detrimental impact 
on last remaining significant IS supporter Twitter activity) and 
cons (e.g. further degradation of Twitter as a source of data or open 
source intelligence on IS). Like all disruption activity, whether this 
is viewed positively or negatively depends on one’s perspective and 
institutional interests. For example, law enforcement tends to favour 
this approach, whereas free-speech advocates warn against corporate 
policing of political speech, even if that speech is deeply objection-
able. Some intelligence professionals, on the other hand, advocate 
for greater attention to social media intelligence.33
Our focus in this report has not just been on Twitter, but we 
also point to the importance of the wider jihadist social media 
ecology. Also, our analysis was not restricted to IS users and content; 
we underline, too, the presence and often uninterrupted online 
activity of non-IS jihadists. In recent years, many counter-terrorism 
professionals tasked with examining the role of the Internet in 
violent extremism and terrorism have narrowed their focus to IS. 
33 David Omand, Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, ‘Introducing Social 
Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)’. Intelligence and National Security, 
27(6), 2012, pp. 801–823.
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Scholarly researchers have 
acted similarly, many narrowing 
their focus further to IS Twitter 
activity. We recommend against 
continued analytical contraction. 
Instead, we point to the need to 
maintain a wide-angle view of 
online activity by diverse other 
jihadists across a variety of social 
media and other online plat-
forms. This is particularly important due to the shifting fortunes of 
IS and HTS on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In the face of increasing 
loss of physical territory, the continued – and potentially increas-
ing – importance of online ‘territory’ should not be underestimated. 
We are not suggesting that a focus on IS should be dispensed with, 
but the significantly less-impeded online activity of HTS is surely 
an important asset for them and worth monitoring.
Because data collection and analysis of other terrorist groups and 
their online platforms has been neglected, very few historical metrics 
are available for comparative analyses. We should guard against this 
in future too.
We recommend against 
continued analytical contraction. 
Instead, we point to the need 
to maintain a wide-angle view 
of online activity by diverse 
other jihadists across a variety 
of social media and other 
online platforms.
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7. FUTURE 
RESEARCH
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as mentioned above, our Other Jihadist category was a conven-
ience sample of non-IS jihadist accounts. For future research, we 
therefore propose replicating the present research, but with a larger 
and more equal sample of HTS, Ahrar al-Sham and Taliban accounts. 
This would allow for a more systematic and comparative analysis 
of the disruption levels for a range of non-IS jihadists, including 
those with a significant international terrorism footprint (i.e. HTS), 
groups with a significant national and regional terrorism profile 
(i.e. Taliban), and a party to the Syria conflict (i.e. Ahrar al-Sham).34 
Such an analysis could help to ascertain the vibrancy of their contem-
porary Twitter communities and Twitter out-linking practices, and 
allow us to identify their preferred other online platforms.
Additional research is clearly warranted into the wider violent 
jihadist social media ecology. We therefore recommend wider and 
more in-depth research into:
1. patterns of use, including community-building and influencing 
activity; and
2. levels of disruption on other platforms besides Twitter, including 
other major platforms such as YouTube, but also other smaller or 
more obscure platforms, such as justpaste.it and others.
We also suggest analysing pro-IS and other jihadist activity on 
Telegram, which is almost certainly where the IS online community 
has reconstituted, and comparing this with our present findings. It 
would also be worthwhile analysing out-linking trends on Telegram 
to see if different platforms have an impact on the effectiveness of 
linking practice.
34 Nationally, Syria, Russia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE have designated Ahrar 
al-Sham as a terrorist organisation. Internationally, the US, Britain, France, 
and Ukraine blocked a May 2016 Russian proposal to the United Nations to 
take a similar step.
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our data showed that the costs for most pro-IS users of engaging 
on Twitter (in terms of deflated morale, diffused messages and 
persistent effort needed to maintain a public presence) now largely 
outweigh the benefits. This means that the IS Twitter community 
is now almost non-existent. In turn, this means that radicalisation, 
recruitment and attack planning opportunities on this platform 
have probably also decreased. However, a hard core of users remain 
persistent. In particular, a subset of established throwaway dissemi-
nator accounts pushed out ‘official’ IS content in a daily cycle during 
our data-collection period. These accounts were generally suspended 
within 24 hours, but not before they promoted links to content hosted 
on other platforms. This included major new content, such as a new 
issue of the monthly IS Rumiyah magazine.
This report is mainly concerned with pro-IS Twitter accounts 
and their disruption. However, IS are not the only jihadists active on 
Twitter, and a host of other violent jihadists were shown to be subject 
to much lower levels of disruption by Twitter. Also, IS and other 
jihadist groups remain active on a wide range of other social media 
platforms, content hosting sites and other cyberspaces, including 
blogs, forums, and dedicated websites. While it appears that official 
IS content is being disrupted in many of these online spaces, the 
extent is yet to be fully determined.
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